IT IS WELL KNOWN that for a finite exchange economy, where preferences are not assumed to be convex, there may be no price equilibrium or even the core may be empty. For this reason it was proposed to enlarge the set of price equilibria and the core by introducing the concepts of "approximate equilibrium" and "approximate core."
assumed to hold relative to coordinates.) We also define, for every t in T, a vector wt in Q, wt # 0 (the initial endowment of trader t).
We To state our second assumption we need a mathematical concept which reflects the intuitive idea of "similar agents." This concept is a topology on the set of preferences. A precise definition of the topology is postponed to Appendix 1, since it is applied explicitly only in Appendix 2, while through the rest of the paper we need only know that there is such a topology. ASSUMPTION 
2-Compactness of Preferences:
The set { >_tb-T is compact.
We may note that Assumption 2 is fairly weak since, for instance, the set of all irreflexive, transitive, open, and monotonic2 preferences is compact in our topology. 3 Before we state the main theorem we need a few more notations. For a set A we denote by IAI the number of its element. For a e Rd and A c Rd, let p(a, A)= infbeA la -bi. Further, e will denote the vector (1, . . ., 1) E Rd. THEOREM 1: If T satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, then for every ? > 0 and ( > 0, there is an integer n such that for every economy E in T with YtEE w, > IEIbe and JEl > n there is an allocation {Xt}teE and a price vector p e S such that: (i) for each t E E, pxt = pwt and p(xt, V,(t, p)) < e; (ii) I {t e Elxt 0 f(t, p)} I < n.
An allocation satisfying (i) and (ii) will be referred to as n-bounded ?-equilibrium. It follows from (i) and (ii) that the aggregate deviation of the traders' bundles from their demands is bounded by a bound independent of the number of traders in the economy, namely YteE P(Xt, O/t, p)) < ?n.
A coalition C is a nonempty subset of E. Given x and y in Q, we denote by x e y the vector whose jth coordinate is max {O, xi - According to Theorem 1 there is an integer n such that for every economy E with IEl > n and DteE wt > IEI be there is an c'-equilibrium ({xt}, p). Furthermore, we know from the proof of Theorem 1 that there is an c'-equilibrium with p satisfying p ) rle. We claim that such an c'-equilibrium of E is in the E-core of E.
Assume to the contrary that the allocation {xtj is e-blocked, i.e., there is a coali- 
